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FREE SPEECH AND CONSTITUTIONAL
TRANSFORMATION
Daniel Hildebrand*
"[This case] raises questions of grave importance transcending
the local interests involved in the particular action." So wrote Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes in Near v. Minnesota,1 the second
Supreme Court case to protect free speech under a conscious and
articulated theory of the First Amendment. In an extraordinary
series of opinions throughout the 1930s, Hughes and Justice Owen
Roberts went on to author a First Amendment jurisprudence based
upon the centrality of free speech in a democratic government. Perhaps because the Warren Court offered such admirable support for
free speech during the civil rights era, perhaps because Hughes and
Roberts never matched the grand rhetoric of Brandeis in Whitney v.
California2 or Brennan in New York Times v. Sul/ivan,3 or perhaps
because FOR's court-packing plan gave a special historical prominence to the 1930s commerce clause cases, the First Amendment
decisions of the Hughes Court receive scant attention in modem
scholarship. Two central lessons are obscured by this neglect: first,
that a coherent First Amendment tradition honoring the centrality
of rich public debate begins as early as the 1930s, and second, that
the main constitutional achievements of the 1930s Court-newly legitimate national economic regulation and incipient protection of
minorities under the Fourteenth Amendment-are Siamese twins,
born of the First Amendment cases and linked by the triumph of
national interests over "local interests" like those alluded to in
Near.
The first lesson of the Hughes Court First Amendment cases
concerns the popular sense of how long courts have understood and
protected free speech. If there is a popular vision of the Court's free
speech tradition, it runs something as follows: free speech issues
• Law Clerk, 1992-93, to the Honorable Walter J. Cummings, Circuit Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. I wish to thank Owen Fiss and Akhil Amar
of the Yale Law School, Richard Friedman of the University of Michigan Law School, my
co-clerk Matthew J. Jacobs and Heidi Steele of McDermott, Will & Emery.
I. 283 u.s. 697, 707 (1931).
2. 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
3. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
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were either non-existent or ignored by the Court from the Bill of
Rights until the 1920s. Then, the Court got off to a bad start in the
Red Scare cases, upholding shockingly repressive state and federal
statutes with little or no First Amendment review, while Holmes
and Brandeis registered ringing dissents. The wisdom of these dissents gradually became law, but under the grip of the early "clear
and present danger test," the Court was slow to articulate a sophisticated First Amendment jurisprudence with consistent results in
hard cases. Not until the 1960s did the free speech of minorities
and other unpopular groups enjoy full protection; not until New
York Times did the Court express "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. "4 Offered most prominently by
Harry Kalven's scholarship, this view of First Amendment jurisprudence deserves revision.
Focusing on the First Amendment decisions of the Hughes
Court allows those who champion free speech to draw on a judicial
tradition thirty years older than the 1960s, one less vulnerable to
rhetoric that attacks the liberalism of the Warren Court as dependent on an activist, overreaching federal judiciary. If Hughes Court
decisions reveal the same theoretical framework and the same basic
values as Warren Court decisions, then scholars or critics can speak
more forcefully of a consistent, core free speech tradition that recognizes and affirms the central importance of rich public debate to
American democracy. The language and logic of the Hughes Court
First Amendment decisions reveal that they establish virtually all
the theories and protections of New York Times and the "modern"
1960s cases, while avoiding the complex, often sterile formalism of
more recent decisions.
The second lesson of the Hughes Court First Amendment
cases probes a different professional narrative, the one which accounts for the changes the 1930s wrought in constitutional jurisprudence. The standard view of this period, as offered in first semester
constitutional law courses, runs as follows: The Lochner era Court
read the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect liberty of contract and invalidated many congressional efforts
to regulate the national economy. Pressured by the "court packing" plan of the popular Roosevelt administration, the Court finally
backed down in the steel strike case.s In famous footnote four of
United States v. Caro/ene Products,6 a subsequent case upholding
4.
5.
6.

ld. at 270.
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937).
304 u.s. 144, 152 (1938).
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Congress's authority to regulate the milk industry, the Court suggested that it would still apply heightened scrutiny to laws that
were insulated from legislative review, or laws that affected minorities who might be less protected by the political process. The traditional view of this famous shift in commerce clause jurisprudence
juxtaposes judicial deference and judicial scrutiny. It focuses on issues of constitutional interpretation, as though the Court after
Carolene Products redirected all its substantive due process energy
to a more appropriate arena, and learned an important separationof-powers lesson in judicial legitimacy.
The cases cited in Carolene Products's footnote four, however,
sketch a more complicated picture, revealing that the Court's shift
in the 1937 commerce clause cases borrowed from a vision of nationalism first expressed in First Amendment cases like Near. In
both the later commerce clause cases and the free speech cases, the
Court was willing to recognize that local actions (economic or political) had profound national ramifications, and hence were subject to
review and correction by the national government. The differing
institutional settings can easily obscure this basic similarity-it is
not obvious that Supreme Court protection of local fringe groups
from municipal or state suppression raises the same issues as national regulation of Schechter's local poultry business. Recall that
the Four Horsemen typically supported the local oppressor of the
Jehovah's Witness or the Communist as well as the local business
chafing under congressional regulation, however, and one's focus
sharpens: the critical issue becomes the conflict of local and national imperatives, not the degree or sphere of judicial scrutiny.
The first great achievement of the Hughes Court lay in asserting
that local suppression of speech could corrupt the national democratic process. Six years later the Court applied essentially the same
nationalist logic to uphold new regulation of local economic activity
under the commerce clause.
The parallels between the Hughes Court's First Amendment
cases and its later commerce clause cases are startling when viewed
in this light. Like the post-1936 commerce clause opinions, the
early First Amendment opinions flew in the face of recent and directly contrary precedents. They took power away from local polities-power to regulate speech in the general welfare-and
transferred control and review of free speech to the Supreme Court,
an arm of the national government. The First Amendment opinions, followed by the commerce clause cases, championed a new
faith in the ability of the national government to monitor the democratic process and the economy in service of greater freedom and
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prosperity for the entire country. In method, inspiration and result,
then, the free speech cases prefigured the "switch-in-time" of the
more famous commerce clause cases. Against the common picture
of a decisive shift in constitutional jurisprudence around the events
of 1936, the First Amendment decisions work their subtle revolution in 1931-before Roosevelt was twice elected, before he resorted
to threats of court packing.
These nationalist free speech cases were paralleled by the
Hughes Court's articulation of a national commitment to minimum
requirements of due process in criminal proceedings. Synthesizing
these developments, the Court in Palko v. Connecticut held that
states would be bound to respect elements in the Bill of Rights that
were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."1 Palko was one of
the first decisions to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states.
Comparison of the cases cited in Palko and Caro/ene Products
reveals that both relied on free speech cases such as Stromberg v.
Californias and DeJonge v. Oregon.9 By reflecting more deeply on
the notion of a national commitment to civil rights, the free speech
cases also helped inspire the incorporation of the Bill of Rights
against the states.
The free speech theory of the 1930s cases directly relates to
their role as a harbinger of constitutional change. If one underplays
the coherence of the Hughes Court's free speech theory, one misses
the recurrent emphasis that speech must be protected as central to
peaceable, orderly change in the government. This emphasis in
tum makes local suppression of speech an assault on the vitality of
the national democratic process. Understanding the nationalism of
the free speech cases thus renders famous footnote four of Caro/ene
Products less dramatic. The footnote is best read as a belated acknowledgement of continuity between the recent commerce clause
cases, the First Amendment decisions and the protection of fundamental liberties promised by Palko. Emphasis on the democratic
political process permeates the text of the entire footnote; it melds
perfectly with the case's support for national economic regulation
by Congress. Localism is out, national democracy is in.
In sum, then, the free speech cases of the 1930s teach two exciting lessons. First, they establish the democratic importance of
rich public debate while elaborating most essential modem free
speech doctrines by 1940. Second, they foreshadow the great shifts
in commerce clause and due process jurisprudence and identify
7.
8.
9.

302
283
299

u.s.
u.s.
u.s.

319, 325 (1937).
359 (1931).
353 (1937).
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1931 as a critical watershed in the major constitutional changes of
the 1930s. Part I of this paper offers a brief introduction to the free
speech tradition before 1930. Part II shows that Near and
Stromberg prove both the lessons outlined above: they offer a free

speech theory that identifies democratic debate as the core of the
First Amendment and they break radically from earlier cases that
subordinated free speech to principles of federalism. Part III explores how the cases that followed Near developed most of the doctrines used in modern First Amendment analysis. Part IV examines
the parallels between the free speech cases of 1931 and later developments in commerce clause, due process and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and proposes that the free speech cases helped
initiate the great constitutional changes of the 1930s.
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT BEFORE THE
HUGHES COURT

Between the Alien and Sedition Acts and the Fourteenth
Amendment, courts had little occasion to review the meaning of the
First Amendment. Under Barron v. Baltimore,w the First Amendment did not apply to the states, so various state efforts to restrict
speech were not reviewable in the federal courts. Most notable state
suppressions of First Amendment rights occurred in the South between the 1830s and the 1860s: Southern states placed severe restrictions on distribution of abolitionist literature, forbade Blacks
from assembling for religious or other purposes and even criminalized teaching Blacks to read the Bible. II Before the civil war, basic
state law on free speech remained similar to that found in the English common law and Blackstone: prior restraints were forbidden,
but punishment of speech was permissible and truth was not a defense to charges of seditious libel absent good motives.12 Aside
from abuses related to support for slavery, however, few prosecutions for what today would be considered First Amendment activity
occurred.
After the Civil War, the Slaughter-House Cases read only narrow rights such as habeas corpus and petition or assembly to bind
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 so the First Amendment still did not check state suppression of speech. Between the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Red Scare cases of
10. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
II. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale
L.J. 1193, 1215-17 (1992).
12. See Leonard W. Levy, The Emergence of a Free Press (Oxford U. Press, 1985).
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).
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the 1920s, courts were very hostile to free speech, regularly supporting state and local actions that would now be considered egregious
breaches of the First Amendment.I4 A few cases serve to illustrate
the flavor of First Amendment jurisprudence in this era. Revealingly, two were by Justice Holmes, belated author of pro-free
speech dissents in the 1920s.
Davis v. Massachusetts 1s reviewed an ordinance that forbade
speaking on the commons and public garden without a permit from
the mayor, who routinely granted permits to political speakers.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance was properly used to bar the speeches of a local religious critic of the mayor.
Patterson v. Colorado 16 upheld the contempt conviction of a U.S.
Senator who criticized a local court proceeding in the Colorado papers. At the time his editorials were published, the Colorado case
was concluded save for motions for rehearing and publishing of the
decision; there were no jury bias issues to favor punishing the editorials. Finally, Fox v. Washington 11 upheld the conviction of a local
nudist who criticized state indecency laws. The nudist had published a diatribe in a local paper, criticizing the puritanism of those
who sought to have the indecency laws enforced against a local nudist colony. A Washington state court found that his article was an
incitement to violate the state indecency laws, and convicted the
writer under a statute banning advocacy to break the law. In all
three cases, the Supreme Court found that the convictions raised no
First Amendment issues.
Fox and Patterson contained a hopeful note that was to prove
fruitful in the future: both declined to decide whether free speech
was protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, finding the question unnecessary to resolve the case. If a
question remains open without being decided long enough, it becomes a small matter for the Court to decide the question either
way-and in Gitlow v. New York,1s the Court in an opinion by Justice Sanford assumed in passing that the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause barred states from restricting free speech rights.
Sanford cited Fox, Patterson and Robertson v. Baldwin.I9 The role of
the First Amendment in fostering incorporation will be taken up in
14. See David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 Yale L.J.
514 (1981).
15. 167 u.s. 43 (1897).
16. 205 u.s. 454 (1907).
17. 236 u.s. 273 (1915).
18. 268 u.s. 652, 666 (1925).
19. 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (reviewing limits on fundamental freedoms in the Bill of
Rights, including limits on free speech).
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greater detail later, but this review provides a brief backdrop to the
Hughes and Roberts decisions of the 1930s.
In 1919, the Supreme Court finally began to address the substantive meaning of the First Amendment. Opinions between 1919
and 1931 debated the "clear and present danger" test, with results
consistently adverse to the speaker who criticized the government.
The majority opinions held that legislatures (state or federal) had a
right to punish speech that could lead to bad acts. All that was
necessary, in essence, was a legislative finding that certain speech
had a "dangerous tendency" to incite lawless action. Holmes and
Brandeis argued in frequent dissent that only speech which incited
imminent, serious lawless action could be banned by the government. Holmes and Brandeis developed their clear and present danger theory slowly, over the course of several decisions.2o The
Brandeis concurrence in Whitney v. California is probably the most
eloquent judicial defense of free speech ever delivered;2I it is also the
most developed theoretical synthesis of First Amendment principles
in any 1920s decision.
Dissents do not make a working jurisprudence, however.
While Brandeis (with prompting and support from Holmes, Chaffee
and others) expressed most of the enduring ideals that have
animated First Amendment law to the present day, he did not have
the opportunity to apply these ideals to diverse factual problems in
majority opinions. That task fell to Hughes and Roberts, who
adapted Brandeis's opinions, moved beyond the clear and present
danger test, and founded a mature First Amendment jurisprudence
based on a nuanced respect for the centrality of dissent and debate
to American democracy.
II. STROMBERG AND NEAR
On February 24, 1930, Charles Evans Hughes was sworn in as
chief justice of the United States Supreme Court. This event came
late in a career of distinguished public service; Hughes had been
governor of New York, the republican candidate for president in
1916 (he nearly defeated incumbent Wilson), secretary of state, a
judge on the World Court, and even (1910-1916) an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. 22 In the words of Paul Freund, clerk for
20. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1205 (1983); Harry Kalven, Jr., A Wonhy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in
America 130-166 (Harper & Row, 1988) ("A Wonhy Tradition"). Both offer excellent treatment of the 1920s cases.
21. 274 U.S. at 375-76.
22. Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appointments to
the Supreme Coun 168-71, 201-34 (Oxford U. Press, 3d ed. 1992).
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Brandeis in 1932 and distinguished law professor at Harvard,
Hughes was to become a Chief Justice of "Marshallian" stature.2J
The first two First Amendment cases to come before his court corroborate Freund's judgment, for Hughes's majority opinions established a sophisticated groundwork, self-consciously practical as well
as theoretical, for future cases that could and did come before the
Court. They also wrought a decisive shift in principles of federalism that heralded the Court's later commerce clause and due process cases.
Stromberg v. California,24 decided a month before Near v. Minnesota25 in May of 1931, was the more cautious of the two opinions.
Stromberg was a nineteen-year-old woman who worked as a supervisor at a children's summer camp near San Bernardino. Then as
now, California was at the quirky vanguard of social change, for at
this summer camp the children were taught 'class consciousness,
the solidarity of the workers, and the theory that the workers of the
world are of one blood and brothers all. '26 Every day the kids
hoisted a Soviet flag over the camp, and for this their supervisor was
prosecuted under a California penal statute which made it a felony
to 'display[ ] a red flag ... in any public place ... [1] as a sign,
symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government[,] or [2]
as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action[,] or [3] as an aid
to propaganda that is of a seditious character... ,'27
Hughes's opinion begins with six pages that review the statute
and the trial below and conclude that the trial judge instructed the
jury to convict if the flag had been displayed for any of the three
purposes listed in the statute. The remaining two pages find the
statute's first purpose unconstitutional and overturn the conviction
because the jury could have reached its verdict on the first clause
alone. At first glance, this short, technical opinion is no ringing
victory for free speech; certainly, the statute's second and third
clauses are patent First Amendment violations by modern standards. Attention to Stromberg's logic, however, reveals that its apparent technicality is something of a subterfuge, more crafty and
subversive than it appears, and supportive of free speech in future
cases. Read carefully, Hughes's opinion breaks with recent precedent, adopts a strict standard for reviewing state restrictions on
speech, and justifies all this with a powerful constitutional theory.
23. Paul Freund, Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 43 (1967).
24. 283 u.s. 359 (1931).
25. 283 u.s. 697 (1931)
26. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 362.
27. Id. at 361. I have added the bracketed numbers to show the three bases for conviction offered by Hughes's interpretation of the California statute.
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Hughes's first tactic is a smokescreen: he acknowledges that
free speech is not an absolute right. "There is no question but that
the State may thus provide for the punishment of those who indulge
in utterances which incite to violence and crime and threaten the
overthrow of organized government by unlawful means . . . . We
have no reason to doubt the validity of the second and third clauses
of the statute as construed by the state court to relate to such incitements to violence."2s To appreciate the significance of this formulation, one needs to look back for a moment to earlier majority
opinions upholding the conviction of speakers in the 1920s. As
Harry Kalven correctly points out, the 1920s majority never applied
a protective standard of the "clear and present danger" test in subversive advocacy cases.29 Holmes and Brandeis usually dissented
on the grounds that there was little chance that the speakers actually intended or were likely to incite acts aimed at the violent overthrow of the government. For the majority, this did not matter; it
was enough that the legislature had identified speech with a dangerous tendency to provoke illegal acts at some time in the future.Jo
Although Hughes cites the majority opinion in Gitlow,JI
Stromberg appears to favor the minority test offered by Brandeis in
Whitney.J2 Hughes's sentence structure and analysis do not support
Gitlow 's dangerous tendency analysis. One must listen to how
Hughes's use of active verbs demands a tight causal link between
speech and violence: "utterances which incite to violence and
crime"JJ can be read to require subsequent violence before speech is
punished; "threaten the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means"J4 can be read to protect any speech which does not
really threaten to topple the government by violence. There is no
dangerous tendency language here, no "may incite," only tight, active language that tracks the intent of Brandeis's formulations. To
reinforce this subtle shift towards a more protective "clear and present danger" test, the concluding remark "as construed by the state
court to relate to such incitements to violence"Js cabins the permissible meanings of the statute's second and third clauses.
28. ld. at 368-69.
29. Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition at 150-66 (cited in note 20).
30. See, e.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 668-69.
31. ld. Hughes's other toehold in the precedents was Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927), the only recent extant Supreme Court case to support a speaker. Fiske overturned a

subversive advocacy conviction on the grounds that the utter lack of evidence violated the
due process clause, but it did not update or question Gitlow's dangerous tendency analysis.
32. 274 U.S. at 376-77.
33. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369.
34. ld.
35. ld.
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If this were all Hughes offered, his opinion would be an incremental but significant shift toward support for free speech, a hopeful turn away from the restrictive, almost paranoid decisions of the
1920s. But there is more: after sparing the second and third elements of California's statute, Hughes pounces on the first. He
quotes at length from the cautionary language of the opinion below,
which warned that "opposition" could be read to include legal
political activity. Then his rhetoric, punching tight and hard at the
end of the opinion: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive
to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system."36 Here, in the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court's very first pro-free speech
case, we see rich public debate theory, brief but unmistakable.
Hughes recognizes the popular sovereignty that underlies American
constitutional government, and he echoes the spirit of Brandeis's
magisterial passage in Whitney.37 There is biting satire here, too, in
the use of the word "security"-the logical inference is that political
discussion, not California's statute, serves the security of America.
In sum, Hughes's restrained majority opinion in Stromberg is
best read as subversive of the earlier anti-free speech tradition, an
about-face rather than a cautious swing to the left. Its about-face
quality is more apparent if one considers that Stromberg raised issues identical to the dozen or so subversive advocacy decisions from
the 1920s. With one narrow exception,Js these recent cases supported repressive, hostile treatment of radical speakers by both state
and federal statutes. None of these cases showed the careful attention to statutory construction offered by Hughes-indeed the opinion's very technicality is part of its strength as a departure from the
earlier cases. Sensitivity to the 1920s cases shows that Stromberg
was as dramatic a shift in First Amendment jurisprudence as Jones
& Laughlin was in commerce clause jurisprudence-perhaps more
so, since the latter could draw support from a parallel tradition of
36. ld.
37. [The Founders) believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of American
government.
274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
38. Fiske, 274 U.S. at 380.
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cases upholding certain types of national economic regulation,39
and from early Marshall Court pronouncements such as Gibbons v.
Ogden.40
Near v. Minnesota•I offers an equally forceful repudiation of
earlier First Amendment cases. Near was argued four months
before Stromberg, and the two should be read as a pair. Unlike
Stromberg, which mirrored the facts of earlier subversive advocacy
cases, the facts of Near were unlike any recently before the Court.
Hughes seized this opportunity to write a manifesto on the merits of
a vigorous and critical press that severely curtailed local power to
regulate speech for the general welfare. His opinion generated a
heated and elaborate dissent by all four Horsemen, unlike the two
narrow dissents in Stromberg.
As before, Hughes begins by reviewing the state statute and the
facts below. Minnesota law provided that any 'obscene, lewd and
lascivious' or 'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper,
magazine or other periodical' could be enjoined as a public nuisance.•2 Truth alone was no defense to the statute-the offending
material had to published with good motives as well. A Minneapolis paper called the Saturday Press was indicted under the statute
for publishing "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" articles
about the local government. Hughes relates only that "the articles
charged in substance that a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law
enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically performing
their duties. "43 The bigoted, scurrilous quality of the articles is better conveyed by Butler's dissent, which quotes some representative
passages44-but Hughes's summary is accurate, if understated.
Near lost at trial and in the state supreme court, and was enjoined
from further publication of scandalous newspapers under any
name.•s
Hughes begins his analysis with a critical sentence: "This statute, for the suppression as a public nuisance of a newspaper or periodical, is unusual, if not unique, and raises questions of grave
importance transcending the local interests involved in the particu39. See, e.g., Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding regulation of lottery tickets
sold across state lines); Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding
regulation of interstate railroads); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (upholding regulation of stockyards as a conduit of interstate commerce).
40. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
41. 283 u.s. 697 (1931).
42. ld. at 702.
43. ld. at 704.
44. ld. at 724-27, n.l.
45. Id. at 706.
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lar action." 46 It is easy to forget that the statute was not in fact
unusual, because it patently conflicts with modem free speech values. Recall, however, that numerous cases between 1870 and 1910
had allowed states to regulate speech for the public welfare, which
was all Minnesota's nuisance law purported to accomplish. For
Hughes's purposes, however, the law could be labeled unique because the first Supreme Court cases to discuss the First Amendment
were only a decade old, and all involved criminal punishment, not
civil injunctions. Earlier prior restraint cases like Davis,47 which
allowed a local mayor to censor his critics by denying them a permit, easily disposed of Near's due process argument-yet Hughes
could ignore these cases because they were much older and outside
the well-established boundaries of the recent subversive advocacy
cases. Furthermore, the facts of Near were closer to the 1920s cases
than they first appear. Although the statute allowed the state to
enjoin a newspaper from publication, the injunction was nothing
more than an ex-post remedy for nuisance, and the nuisance had to
be proved as a factual matter before the remedy could issue. In
short, enjoining a paper that has proved to be a public nuisance is
little different from imprisoning a speaker who has made a seditious
speech-both sanctions tum on the content and effect of the speech.
Hughes's opening line, then, is important because it portrays
an ordinary restriction of speech as an unusual one, one that raises
"grave" concerns which may outweigh "local interests." He announces that because "constitutional questions" are involved, the
Court will review the statute as to "operation and effect," not
merely search for errors by the trial court in applying the statute. 48
As in Stromberg, however, this heightened standard of review is entirely new. Precedents only four years old gave local statutes restricting speech only minimal scrutiny. Read alongside Stromberg's
treatment of the California statute, Hughes here establishes de novo
review of First Amendment claims by the Supreme Court.
Hughes proceeds to analyze the "operation and effect" of Minnesota's statute. To paraphrase his lengthy analysis, Hughes interprets the statute to allow public officials to haul a publisher into
court for criticizing the authorities and enjoin him from future critical publication. "This is of the essence of censorship,"49 he concludes-and indeed it is, as he has described the statute, but his
description is highly deceptive. Here, a brief return to Stromberg
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at
Davis
Near,
Id. at

707.
v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
283 U.S. at 708-09.
713.
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helps to decipher what Hughes is doing. Near, like Stromberg, purports to examine a statute very closely to determine its practical
effect on speech-but neither case leaves any room for official discretion to interpret the statute in a permissible way. Stromberg rejected the lower court's decision to assume the local jury would read
the California statute's overly general first prong in light of the permissible purposes of the second and third parts. But in fact, the
entire California statute easily could have been read to prohibit only
speech with a dangerous tendency to provoke lawless action-a natural reading that would have rendered the statute acceptable under
recent Supreme Court opinions. In Stromberg, Hughes insisted on
pessimism, on refusing to give local officials the benefit of the doubt,
and he conjured up an image of the statute being used to repress a
mainstream political opposition party carrying flags. In so doing,
he wrote an opinion that purported to be technical, but in fact undermined the entire California statute by supporting political opposition and reading the constitutional portions to ban only direct
incitements to violence.
In his description of the Minnesota statute's "operation and
effect," Hughes has pulled off the same slight of hand-he characterizes the statute in the most extreme way possible, and describes
its potential operation in a way that suggests it will be used to repress mainstream critics of the government. Here, instead of a
marching mainstream opposition party, there is the image of a publisher writing about corruption in the government and being dragged into court for criticizing the authorities. Hughes's portrait of
the statute is laden with the words "public," "officials" and "authorities." This repeated language emphasizes that officials might
immunize themselves from popular criticism, forcing the reader to
worry about the democratic implications of the law.
This refocusing of concern distracts the reader from recognizing that Near was an easy case that should have gone the other way
under contemporary doctrine. As of 1930 virtually no judge had
ever acknowledged a First Amendment issue when public officials
shut down some crackpot like the antisemitic publisher of the Saturday Review. The statute before Hughes had not been used to censor a mainstream newspaper editorial, and there was no reason on
its face to fear that it would, for the terms "malicious," "scandalous" and "defamatory" did not demand a reading directed at responsible criticism of public officials. Even before its legal analysis
begins, then, Hughes's Near opinion shows a both a deep mistrust
for any law that could allow government officials to entrench themselves against the democratic political process, and a willingness to
protect even fringe critics of the government from punishment.
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Hughes's extreme description of the statute determines the outcome of his analysis, for it enables him to analyze the statute as a
prior restraint law. Even English common law before the American
revolution forbid prior restraints on publication, so Hughes could
strike down Minnesota's statute on the conservative authority of
Blackstone. Hughes cites critics of Blackstone who charged that
the freedom of speech must apply to ex post punishments as well as
prior restraints or mean nothing, but notes that "[i]n the present
case, we have no occasion to inquire as to the permissible scope of
subsequent punishment."so Hughes describes the statute so as to
camouflage the real issue presented by Near: the permissible scope
of the state's power to punish harmful speech.
The remainder of the opinion celebrates the immunity of the
press from prior restraint, and it is punctuated with ringing quotations that emphasize the centrality of a free press to democratic
government. From the Continental Congress:
The importance of [freedom of the press] consists ... in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,
its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its
consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable
and just modes of conducting affairs.st

From Madison:
In every State, probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a
freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men of
every description which has not been confined to the strict limits
of the common law .... [T]o the press alone, chequered as it is
with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which
have been gained by reason and humanity over error and
oppression. s2

Hughes concludes in his own words, "Public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion in the
press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under the
libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and
periodicals."s3
Near is a case that hammers the importance of the First
Amendment as a mechanism for the public to monitor its agents in
50.
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the government. The description of the statute, the legal analysis,
the supporting authority-all emphasize again and again that in a
democracy the people retain a central freedom to criticize their government. Hughes may pretend the statute is only about "prior restraints," but this is of no moment, for the logic of the rich public
debate theory that rolls off page after page is much more powerful,
and Hughes reserves the question of subsequent punishment, saying
it must be "consistent with constitutional privilege."s4 As in
Stromberg, the opinion's logic and unforgiving construction of the
state statute serve as signposts-billboards, really-that send the
reader a strong message about what subsequent punishments might
be upheld by future opinions. The clear losers are state and local
governments, and Hughes's talk of Blackstone and Madison cannot
obscure the fact that in Near the states lose a long-held power to
regulate speech by moderate restraints in support of the general
welfare.
Hughes may fool a modem reader, but he does not fool the
Horsemen. Butler and his posse thunder out of the gates with a
passage that illuminates Near as an utter repudiation of earlier assumptions about the relation between state and federal authority:
The decision of the Court in this case declares Minnesota and
every other State powerless to restrain by injunction the business
of publishing and circulating among the people malicious, scandalous and defamatory periodicals that in due course of judicial
procedure has been adjudged to be a public nuisance. It gives to
freedom of the press a meaning and a scope not heretofore recognized and construes "liberty" in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to put upon the States a federal restriction that is without precedent.ss

Citing Barron v. Baltimore,s6 Butler acknowledges that prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution "did not protect the right
of free speech or press against state action," but he cannot resist
adding that "the constitutions and laws of the States ... operated
adequately to protect it."s 7 Butler exposes a number of deceptions
in the majority opinion. First, he draws a concrete picture of the
facts of the case at hand, offering details that Hughes omitted. Emphasizing the antisemitic nature of the Saturday Review's articles,
he reads "malicious" and "scandalous" only as broadly as their ordinary meaning would allow, and finds (accurately) that the words
54.
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describe the publication before the Court. The footnoted text of the
articles supports Butler's position, for they were highly offensive.ss
Butler also challenges Hughes's exaggerated interpretation of
the statute. He writes, "The defendant here has no standing to assert that the statute is invalid because it might be construed so as to
violate the Constitution. His right is limited solely to the inquiry
whether ... the effect of applying the statute is to deprive him of his
liberty without due process of law."s9 For Butler, the law does not
deprive Near of liberty without due process: the motives ofthe statute aim at protecting the public's interest in repressing scandalous
and malicious stories; the defendant is not suppressed without a
hearing; and the statute provides adequate defenses to protect socially useful publications that print truthful accusations for publicspirited reasons. Butler reminds us that "this court is by well established rule required to assume, until the contrary is made to appear,
that there exists in Minnesota a state of affairs that justifies [the
statute]."60
This last point is more than a bland repetition of a rule of statutory construction-for with his sensitive interest in the facts, Butler finds evidence that Near's various business activities (including
publishing) are properly a serious concern of the local authorities.
He cites evidence that Near's paper had been used to blackmail former business associates, and that Near was linked to gambling and
organized crime. In other words, Butler sees the good guys and bad
guys rather differently from Hughes. To read Hughes's opinion,
one would think that the government of "urban" Minneapolis was
riddled with potential for crime and corruption, checked only by
"courageous" publishers like Near. The reader has no reason to
prefer one factual picture to the other, of course, but the discrepancy supports the theory that Hughes has a broader agenda, an
agenda which champions the First Amendment as a safeguard of
the people's right to monitor, instruct or recall their agents in the
government.
Butler closes by attacking Hughes's effort to paint the dispute
as a prior restraint case. Butler points out that Blackstone understood prior restraints as unbridled discretion in the hands of administrative officers. This was not how the statute worked, as we have
seen, and Butler stresses the point:
It is fanciful to suggest similarity between the granting or en58. In modern jurisdictions such as Canada that control hate speech, Near's articles
might be grounds for criminal prosecution.
59. Near, 283 U.S. at 725-26.
60. ld. at 731.
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forcement of the decree authorized by this statute to prevent further publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles
and the previous restraint upon the press by licensers as referred
to by Blackstone and described in the history of the times to
which he alludes.61

Butler thus reads the statute to impose subsequent punishment, not
prior restraint.
Attention to Butler's dissent, then, confirms the view of Near
offered above: the opinion was crafted to chart a new direction in
First Amendment jurisprudence. In Near and its companion
Stromberg, Hughes effected a radical break with the earlier anti-free
speech tradition of the 1920s, and in so doing he asserted that an
intrusive federal norm unrecognized by earlier cases would henceforth limit local actions. Hughes supported this about-face with repeated language which emphasized that the First Amendment
protects criticism of the government as central to democracy. This
analysis reveals Near as an early companion to New York Times v.
Sul/ivan,62 a prototype that shows a similar concern for public debate in the democratic process. The parallel emerges more strongly
if one considers the factual and institutional issues that underlay the
two opinions. Both cases reviewed a common-law doctrine used by
local officials to censure their critics, and both held that federal
norms restricted the scope of local action. The plaintiffs in New
York Times were more sympathetic than those in Near, and Brennan could draw on a richer body of free speech writings to develop
his elegant opinion, but neither of these differences should obscure
Near's stature as the foundation of a jurisprudence devoted to the
protection of rich public debate.
Taken together, the structure and logic of Near and Stromberg
suggested that in future cases, the Court would closely scrutinize
local actions that might compromise the integrity of the political
process by restricting speech. Over the next ten years the Court
was to fulfill the implicit promises of Near and Stromberg by supporting free speech against a diverse array of local challenges.
III.

THE CONTOURS OF A TRADITION

Harry Kalven envisioned the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases as an organic tradition that over time perfects the rules
of democratic debate.63 While Kalven was an astute reader of opinions and a thorough student of the major Hughes Court cases, he
61.
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may not have observed that the tradition he saw elaborated over
decades and culminating in New York Times v. Sullivan was actually intact in its essential details and insights by 1940. Near and
Stromberg introduced the foundation of this nascent tradition: the
theory that free critical debate was essential to the ongoing process
of democratic government. Subsequent Hughes Court cases built
over this foundation the essential architecture of modem First
Amendment analysis: doctrines such as strict scrutiny, void for
vagueness, chilling and unbridled discretion. The free speech opinions of 1931-1941 thus delineate most of the liberal First Amendment tradition commonly celebrated as a product of the 1960s.
Before reviewing the cases that built on the achievements of
Near and Stromberg, it might be helpful to summarize the First
Amendment doctrines the first two opinions established. By giving
detailed readings of state laws and declining to presume the laws
were constitutional, both applied what was later called "strict scrutiny" to statutes restricting free speech. Near founded prior restraint doctrine, and although it quoted Blackstone and early
republican sources for a traditional common-law view of the doctrine, its strong language could be readily extended to condemn
other regulatory schemes that restricted the press.
The Court's next First Amendment opinion broadened Near's
prior restraint analysis into a doctrine invoked to review government actions that burdened the press without raising concerns of
naked censorship by injunction or administrative order. Citing
Near, the Court in Grosjean v. American Press Co. 64 held that a two
percent tax on the gross profits of Louisiana's largest newspapers
was an unconstitutional prior restraint of free speech. After a thorough summary of Near's reasoning, Grosjean found that Near's test
applied to "any action of the government by means of which it
might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as
seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent
exercise of their rights as citizens."6s Sutherland concludes "[a]
free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."66 One is moved to wonder aloud if this can possibly be the
same judge who joined Butler's angry dissent in Near five years earlier. Evidently the democratic importance of a free press was persuasive enough to win over some of its early detractors. Sutherland
celebrates the same popular right to criticize and monitor the gov64.
65.
66.
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ernment that had been either novel or controversial in recent Brandeis and Hughes opinions. Some of his enthusiasm, however, may
derive from the claimants' status as mainstream, established corporations who gained the benefit of important new protections under
the due process clause.
In early 1937, the Court returned to subversive advocacy issues
in DeJonge v. Oregon.67 The case arose under Oregon's criminal
syndicalism act, which outlawed speeches or writings that advocated 'crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or
methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or
political change or revolution.'6s De Jonge was a member of the
Communist Party; he attended and spoke at a public meeting in
Portland sponsored by the local party chapter. Various people
spoke about local jail conditions and a local strike, but there was no
evidence of any advocacy of criminal syndicalism as defined by the
statute, and only 10-15% of those who attended were party members. After reviewing the record below, Hughes found that De
Jonge was tried, convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison
solely because "he had assisted in the conduct of a public meeting,
albeit otherwise lawful, which was held under the auspices of the
Communist Party."69
DeJonge was an easy case. Even before Near and Stromberg,
Fiske v. Kansas1o had overturned a subversive advocacy conviction
for the absence of any supporting evidence: here also there was no
evidence of subversive advocacy. Hughes's DeJonge analysis echoes Stromberg. It confirms that only incitements to crime may be
punished as an abuse of the right of free speech: "[L]egislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with
the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed."7I In a
passage of remarkable clarity, he argues (as he implied in
Stromberg) that free speech is essential to state security and democratic government:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly
in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion,
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government. 72

Ten years later, Hughes here establishes as law Brandeis's great assertion from Whitney, that repression of speech and democracy are
incompatible. 73 De Jonge left unresolved the issue of when advocacy against the state would become an unlawful incitement to violence, and it added no new doctrines to the Court's First
Amendment analysis. But it settled the essential theory of free
speech jurisprudence: in a democratic government, the people command a sovereign power to criticize the government and debate its
actions. As of early 1937, all four Hughes Court First Amendment
opinions had extolled this principle.
In April of 1937, the Court in Herndon v. Lowry74 reviewed
the eighteen year sentence of a communist convicted for fomenting
insurrection in Georgia. One searches the opinion in vain for his
first name, but Herndon must have possessed awe-inspiring courage, for in addition to being a communist he was black, and the
party sent him to Atlanta to start a local organization and distribute
literature that advocated, among other things, '[e]qual rights for the
Negroes and self-determination for the Black Belt.'7s After enlisting several members and conducting three meetings, he was arrested, and if his work had barely begun, in retrospect he may have
been fortunate-Georgia law punished insurrection with death, mitigated to five to twenty years only if the jury recommended mercy.
In the first of several influential free speech decisions he was to author, Justice Roberts reviewed at length the statute and the findings
of the courts below-a structure that mimicked the earlier Hughes
opinions. He found that Herndon's conviction rested primarily on
the content of the literature found when Herndon was arrested-the
literature advocating self-determination for blacks in the South.
There was no evidence that any literature had been distributed.
Roberts also found that the state had used a "dangerous tendency"
standard to determine what acts were insurrection.
Roberts's treatment of the case vindicates Stromberg as a repudiation of earlier 1920s subversive advocacy decisions. First, he expressly rejects dangerous tendency analysis: "[Gitlow] furnishes no
warrant for the appellee's contention that ... the standard of guilt
may be made the 'dangerous tendency' of [ ] words. "76 As we saw
72.
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above, however, Gitlow stood for just this standard. Roberts follows
Stromberg by adopting the incitement standard to review subversive
advocacy cases, and here he quotes the "clear and present danger"
language (its first appearance in a decade) from the 1920s dissents
of Holmes and Brandeis. Roberts states that the government may
punish speakers only when "wilful and intentional interference with
the described operations of the government might be inferred from
the time, place, and circumstances of [their] act[s]."77 For Roberts,
the "clear and present danger" image expresses a requirement that
some immediate threat to the operation of government must be
present before officials may punish a speaker.
Roberts also establishes the important First Amendment doctrine of "void for vagueness." He writes, "[W]here a statute is so
vague and uncertain as to make criminal an utterance or an act
which may be innocently said or done with no intent to resort to
violence ... a conviction under such a law cannot be sustained." 78
Roberts shows that "void for vagueness" is the critical flaw of dangerous tendency analysis-statutes that punish words for their dangerous tendency hold speakers responsible for remote and unlikely
events that the speaker may neither wish for nor intend. Such uncertain penalties unconstitutionally burden a speaker's power of free
speech. He links this insight to the essential free speech theory of
the Hughes decisions: "peaceful agitation for a change of our form
of government is within the guaranteed liberty of speech .... "79
Roberts explains the application of these principles to
Herndon's case in the remainder of the opinion. He writes first that
the statute as applied punished Herndon for enlisting members into
a political party. Herndon was not punished because he himself advocated violence against the government, but because his political
party printed materials that advocated possible resort to violence
against the government at some indefinite time in the future. The
state made no showing that any literature threatening its security
was distributed, or that insurrection was even remotely likely. Roberts therefore concludes that the statute involves a jury in "pure
speculation as to future trends of thought and action." He points
out that "[t]he Act does not prohibit incitement to violent interference with any given activity or operation of the state .... Nor is
any specified conduct or utterance of the accused made an offense."so He closes by again stressing the burden such a law places
77.
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on the popular right to press for changes in the government:
The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely to a
dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change of
government if a jury can be persuaded that he ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect in the future conduct of
others. No reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate are the boundaries thus set
to the freedom of speech and assembly that the law necessarily
violates the guarantees of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment.s1

One sees in Herndon isolated cases beginning to cohere as a tradition around the organizing principle of freedom to criticize the government. Upon the bare bones of this theory, first offered by
Stromberg, Herndon looks to DeJonge for support and fleshes out
some important new doctrines and standards. The cases begin to
interact with one another, suggesting doctrines not yet present in
any single case alone.
Herndon shows by implication that statutes held "void for
vagueness" raise two independent concerns. The first is notice-under a dangerous tendency regime, speakers will not be sure when
they will be liable for arguing for changes in the government. This
concept finds expression in later cases as a concern for laws that
"chill" the exercise of free speech rights. The second issue alluded
to by these cases is the problem of "unbridled discretion" of local
officials to interpret a vague law. One sees Hughes in Stromberg
worried about the possibility that public officials can apply speechrestricting laws to silence their opponents. By the time Roberts articulates the "void for vagueness" doctrine in Herndon, the concern
for abuse of official discretion lies just beneath the surface of his
statements about the jury's freedom to speculate about the future
consequences of a speech.
It is no surprise, then, that the next Supreme Court First
Amendment case formally establishes that laws which vest public
officials with unbridled discretion over the power of free speech are
unconstitutional. Lovell v. City of Griffin s2 reviewed a Georgia
town ordinance that required those who wished to distribute handbills or literature on the city streets to get a permit from the local
officials. Lovell, a Jehovah's Witness, believed that to seek permission from the city for her proselytizing would violate her religion's
commandments. When she did not apply for a permit, she was
cited for handbilling. Hughes's opinion is brief, clipped and em81.
82.
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phatic. He describes the ordinance as one that "embraces literature
in the widest sense." After holding the ordinance facially invalid,
he writes, "Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its
character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. "sJ
Here again, the logical justification for this summary result is
Hughes's concern for preserving First Amendment freedoms as a
vehicle to criticize the government. There was no evidence to suggest the ordinance was being applied in a discriminatory way, for
the Jehovah's Witness had not even applied for a permit. Hughes
uses the words "license and censorship" to convey his sense that the
ordinance offers a dangerous potential for official abuse of authority. He concludes, "The press ... comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion. What we
have had recent occasion to say with respect to the vital importance
of protecting this essential liberty from every sort of infringement
need not be repeated,"s4 and he cites Near, Grosjean and DeJonge.
The citation refers to both subversive advocacy cases and free press
cases, and what "need not be repeated" is their shared mantra that
a democratic people must retain the power of free speech so that
they may freely and openly criticize their government.
Lovell offers two important additions to the growing free
speech tradition of the Hughes Court. First, the record did not suggest that the Jehovah's Witnesses were agitating for a change in the
government-as observed above, they had not even been denied a
permit. Hughes was simply concerned with the structure of the ordinance and the power it placed in local officials. It mattered not
that the speakers were now a religious minority with no apparent
political agenda. This suggests an insight elaborated more fully in
Cantwell v. Connecticut ss and subsequent religious freedom casesnamely, that democratic society demands an openness for all types
of opinion, even those not expressly directed at reforming government. Cantwell, discussed below, illuminates this theory more completely than Hughes's attenuated opinion in Lovell, however, so I
will set aside this idea for the moment.
Second, Lovell invents a vital formulation that still has a contested role in First Amendment jurisprudence. While criticizing the
Griffin ordinance, Hughes writes that it "prohibits the distribution
of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any man83.
84.
85.
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ner without a permit from the City Manager."s6 Later opinions
inverted this statement, finding that more narrow restrictions on the
time, place or manner of speech were permissible. Hughes elaborated this aspect of Lovell four years later in Cox v. New Hampshire,87 where he upheld a local ordinance requiring that groups
planning a parade in the city streets first get a permit from the
mayor. Here again, the plaintiffs were Jehovah's Witnesses who
claimed that applying for a permit would be against their religious
beliefs. Hughes passed over the free exercise aspect of their First
Amendment claims. Distinguishing Lovell, he found that liberty
depended on a certain degree of organization in society, and that
the parade permit system was constitutional because it was narrowly directed at 'organized formations of persons using the highways.'ss Since these early, functionalist and innocuous beginnings,
however, "time, place, manner" analysis has grown into a vast category of exceptions to the First Amendment, allowing governments
to restrict speaking opportunities in a broad variety of ways.s9
Perhaps the most interesting and difficult First Amendment
opinion from the Hughes Court era was Hague v. C.10.,90 decided
a year after Lovell in 1939. The case arose from the enforcement of
Jersey City ordinances against the C.I.O. Under color of the ordinances, labor organizers were repeatedly denied permits to speak in
the town halls, searched upon entry into the city, barred from pamphleting on the city streets, and even forcibly ejected from the city
limits. Even in the matter-of-fact language of Roberts's opinion, the
whole scene appears as a Hughesian nightmare, confirming the
worst fears of opinions like Stromberg and Lovell-for in Jersey
City, local officials showed themselves eager to use power over
speech to entrench themselves against opposing views. Hague
found in favor of the union 5-2 (two justices did not participate).
The majority agreed that the Jersey City ordinances were an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. In a remarkable debate, however, they split over the question of whether the privileges and
immunities clause or the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment compelled this result. Roberts, joined by Black and
Hughes, favored the former result, Stone and Reed the later. Since
both sides agreed on the importance of free debate, however, further
discussion of Hague is unnecessary. Apart from its conflicting
views of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hague fits squarely within the
86.
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evolving tradition of cases concerned with protecting democracy by
restricting the power of local majorities to curtail opposition speech.
Following his opinion in Hague, Roberts in the fall of 1939
delivered Schneider v. State,9I another important free speech decision that added a working methodology to the perhaps doctrinaire
results of earlier Hughes Court cases. Schneider addressed a question suggested by the facts of Lovell. While faced with an inability
to control speech through permits, municipalities could still regulate speech with a technique known today as a "flat ban." Three of
the four cases consolidated before the Court as Schneider involved
ordinances that banned all handbilling from a city's streets because
handbilling tended to cause litter. Roberts held them an invalid restraint of free speech, and his analysis offered a way to accommodate the city's interest in clean streets with the speaker's desire to
communicate with passers-by. As discussed by Owen Piss in a recent article,92 in Schneider Roberts first applied the familiar
"weighted balancing test" to First Amendment claims. He explained, "Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters
of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes
the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. "93 Roberts asked that the regulatory aims of local statutes
be weighed against the heavy importance of free speech in a democratic society. Here, since the municipality could easily control litter by punishing those who threw handbills to the ground, its
interest did not outweigh the burden placed on speech by a flat ban
against handbilling. In Schneider, then, Roberts pioneered an important new method of analysis while adhering to the central free
speech theory he and Hughes had developed in previous opinions:
free speech weighs heavily against other government aims because it
is "vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. "94
In the spring of 1940, the Court decided a pair of labor picketing cases, Car/eson v. California9s and Thornhill v. Alabama,96
where anti-loitering laws had been used to arrest union demonstrators. Justice Murphy overturned the convictions in succinct and
authoritative opinions. He wrote: "[T]he group in power at any
moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful
discussion of matters of public interest merely on a showing that
91.
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others may thereby be persuaded to action inconsistent with its interests."97 Murphy reaffirmed the Court's willingness to hold laws
restricting free speech facially invalid. The language quoted above
reduces the essential Hughes Court free speech theory to a single
sentence. Free speech is not merely a right, it is a power, and the
First Amendment protects the people from their agents in the government who would usurp that power.
Taken as a group, then, the Hughes Court free speech cases
established doctrines of strict scrutiny, prior restraint, void for
vagueness, unbridled discretion, chilling and time, place, manner
exceptions. All of these were supplemented with Roberts's
weighted balancing analysis, which judged First Amendment claims
against the importance of countervailing state interests while recognizing that the public had a serious, continuous interest in open debate. By 1941, a tradition extolling the principle of free public
debate and its supporting doctrines had developed around ten eloquent cases, and this core tradition promised support for a comprehensive and sophisticated free speech jurisprudence in the future.
Before leaving this argument, an eleventh and final Roberts
case offers a beautiful summary of the free speech theory articulated
over the preceding ten years. Cantwell v. Connecticut reviewed a
local law that barred religious groups from soliciting members of
other religions.9s A Jehovah's Witness had approached two
Catholics with a portable phonograph and played a recording that
attacked Catholicism. The opinion held for the first time that freedom of religion was a fundamental liberty protected from state
abridgement by the Fourteenth Amendment. In an analysis that
mirrors the approach in Schneider, Roberts balanced the state interest in regulating solicitation against the freedom of religious conscience. He found that the Jehovah's Witness presented no threat
of disorder, and that the state law was needlessly broad if it could be
applied to arrest a peaceful solicitor. Roberts's concluding statement conjoins freedom of religion and freedom of speech as part of
a common First Amendment tradition:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may
seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times resorts to
exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in
97.
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spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are,
in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.99
Perhaps better than any other short quotation, this passage summarizes the ideal of democratic pluralism that underlies the First
Amendment. More than twenty years before Brennan's New York
Times opinion, it thoroughly foreshadows the reasoning and result
of that great case, even down to its observation that as citizens exchange heated views, they may resort to falsehoods-and that if we
have confidence in openness and respect for one another, we need
not fear such abuse in the long run.
Cantwell provides an apt conclusion to my review of the
Hughes Court's free speech tradition, for it both embraces and
looks beyond the importance of a free exchange of ideas among citizens of a democracy. Cantwell offers a higher vision of the First
Amendment, one that to this day remains unaddressed by the
Supreme Court's free speech tradition. For Roberts, the core tradition protects more than democratic process; it celebrates pluralism,
tolerance, and a respect for the differing views of one's fellow citizens. The opinion presents a surprisingly contemporary distillation
of values and challenges that could unify American citizens in all
our colorful diversity as we struggle to realize the many unfulfilled
promises of our Constitution in a new century.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

Near and Stromberg introduced two lessons the Hughes Court
First Amendment cases could teach the modern student of constitutional law. As to the first lesson, the subsequent 1930s cases should
speak for themselves. Hopefully, they have persuaded readers that
the Hughes Court set forth a sophisticated First Amendment jurisprudence based on the central importance of rich public debate to
democracy, and that the liberal free speech tradition located by the
popular mind as arising out of the 1960s is in fact 30 years older.
Were this all the cases established, they would rank among the most
important contributions to constitutional doctrine in this century.
As I suggested in Part II, however, Near and Stromberg teach a
second lesson. They inaugurate the complex changes in our constitutional jurisprudence that occurred in the 1930s.
Scholars commonly identify two major changes in constitutional law in this century: national economic regulation by the
modern administrative state, and incorporation of the Bill of Rights
99.

Id. at 310.
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against the states. Both these changes were born in the 1930s.
Broad federal regulation of the national economy was first legitimated by the commerce clause cases following NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. 100 and buttressed by separation-of-powers decisions that ratified the new delegation of power to administrative
agencies. Incorporation of fundamental provisions of the Bill of
Rights against the states occurred gradually over a series of cases
holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
bound the states to respect limited rights offree speech101 and minimum standards of criminal due process.1o2
A vast literature surrounds the relationship between these two
changes in constitutional law. Much of it focuses on the problem of
judicial review and the famous footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products. 1o3 My purpose here is neither to challenge this
literature nor engage it on any serious level. Rather, I want to
refocus scholarly attention on the First Amendment's prominent
role as a catalyst of constitutional transformation in the early 1930s.
In my view, scholarly interest in judicial review and substantive due
process should not obscure the pivotal importance of Near's free
speech theory as the herald of a new constitutional regime.
I begin with the strong but overlooked parallel between the
Court's behavior in the first pro-free speech cases and its behavior
in the first pro-national regulation cases. In both instances, the
Court turned its back on a recent, firmly established tradition in
prior cases to endorse a new nationalist agenda. By exploring this
similarity, I stress that the Hughes Court First Amendment cases
came first ; they predated the famous commerce clause shift by five
years. This matters, as it turns out, to certain established schools of
constitutional interpretation, and explodes some of the mythology
surrounding the famous switch in time of 1937.
The first free speech cases cleverly jumped through hoops to
distinguish prior cases that demanded opposite results. Stromberg's
facts were nearly identical to the federal or state subversive advocacy cases of the previous decade that supported restrictions on
speech. In Near, earlier precedents from the tum of the century
provided ample support for the proposition that states or municipalities could regulate the press by prior restraints or ex post punishments in service of the general welfare. Both cases set forth a
radical new program, a commitment to the ideal that local preferences could not be allowed to impede democratic decision-making
100. 301 u.s.
101. Gitlow v.
102. Powell v.
103. 304 U.S.

1 (1937).
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
at 152.
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at the national level-a commitment that had never enjoyed but one
or two votes on the Court.
What does it mean to assert that the Court's new protection of
democratic process was "nationalist"? First, under the logic of
Hughes's opinion, California's suppression of flags flown in opposition to the government was an assault on the integrity of the national democratic process. States and towns had an interest in laws
regulating advocacy against the government-a desire to keep the
peace or to preserve local institutions, for example. For Hughes,
however, in the very first two cases these local interests are openly
trumped by the need for free public debate, "[so] that government
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means .... "104 Why not let local majorities
determine what restrictions on speech impeded their democratic
character? The answer compelled by the logic of Near and
Stromberg is that local governments are prone to capture by selfinterested agents, and the First Amendment protects the people's
sovereign power to direct, and if necessary, replace their agents in
all types of government. Since what passed for subversion in California might be part of a national movement for change, the integrity of national democracy required that the federal government bar
California from interfering with the entire nation's power to alter
the course or structures of its government.
Near, Stromberg and the ensuing free speech tradition are nationalist on a second level, however. For even if governments, both
federal and local, are vulnerable to capture by self-interested agents,
there is nothing on the face of the First Amendment to suggest
which locus of authority-federal or state-should monitor the
democratic integrity of the entire system. An important strain of
American constitutional thought prior to 1930 viewed the actions of
the national government as likely to be undemocratic. National
government was feared as unrepresentative, and local communities
were trusted as the foci of a sovereign people. Even after the First
Amendment bound the states under the Fourteenth, then, it is possible to imagine a vision of democracy that gave local communities
authority to regulate the boundaries of free speech, on the theory
that at a local level, a sovereign people could more easily overturn
rules that impeded their ability to monitor, direct or recall their
agents in the government.
By 1940, however, all eleven free speech cases had restricted
the power of some state or local polity to restrain free speech according to its own best judgments about the general welfare. The
104.

Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369.

162

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:133

federal government, through the national Supreme Court, became
the national arbiter of the democratic process. Before 1931, local
democracies had the power to monitor the representative character
ofboth local and national government. After 1931, the federal government through the Supreme Court usurped this power. With
their nationalist effect thus exposed, Near and Stromberg emerge as
more than exercises in democratic, rich public debate-free speech
theory. They also effect a naked shift of power, a shift from state
and local governments to the national government. Hughes's democratic free speech theory alone cannot justify the shift, for it does
not explain why the Supreme Court is a better monitor of democracy than local communities. As the dissent in Near recognizes, the
case is about much more than prior restraints on the press. It is a
constitutional power shift as novel and shattering as the explosion
of the commerce power six years later.
The 1930s commerce clause jurisprudence follows the same
pattern as the Hughes Court First Amendment cases, but since the
commerce clause story is familiar I will not rehash it with extended
arguments from particular cases. In early 1930s commerce clause
cases, the Court blocked New Deal legislation under a well-established line of cases that had denied the federal government authority to regulate major aspects of the national economy. As Bruce
Ackerman's work forcefully reminds us, FOR's economic program
was endorsed by overwhelming popular and congressional support
for national regulation as a means of lifting the country out of the
depression.ws In 1937, after FDR threatened to pack the Court,
the Supreme Court reversed its earlier position and began to uphold
FOR's programs. One need not locate a "constitutional moment"
or an unwritten amendment to the Constitution in these events to
recognize that they allowed the federal government to assert a new
level of control over local affairs. In 1934, the federal government
could not tell Schechter how to run his local poultry business,t06
but by 1941 it was imposing conditions on the sale of local wheat to
local customers.101 Both the free speech and the commerce clause
cases asserted that local actions, economic and political, had
profound national ramifications that the federal government was
entitled to supervise or regulate. The free speech cases thus provided a model of judicial support for nationalism that was paralleled six years later in the commerce clause cases.
Scholars also study the 1930s to explore the roots of incorpora105. See Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People 47-50 (Belknap Press, 1991).
106. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
107. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
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tion, where the Court began to apply the Bill of Rights against the
states. Again, I do not wish to enter the scholarly debate over the
origins or theory of incorporation. Near, however, reveals 1931 as a
critical watershed in the Court's due process jurisprudence. Under
modern incorporation cases, the due process clause became a constitutional hook for applying the Bill of Rights against the states.
As most first-year law students learn, these cases have a grim and
discredited elder cousin-Lochner.ws The Lochner-era Court read
the due process clause to protect expansive property and contract
rights from federal and state infringement, usually to the advantage
of corporations and to the detriment of poor workers.
Near is the fulcrum of a shift in the Court's due process emphasis-from property and contract rights to civil rights. A reader
can almost see the transition on the face of the opinion; Hughes
supports his free speech analysis by illustrating the due process
analysis of earlier contract and property decisions.109 Before Near,
due process cases mostly protected property and contract rights,
and ignored other individual liberties. After Near, the Court exercised significant judicial review in both areas for about five years,
but then retreated from its long-standing supervision of property
and contracts. A brief canvass of some early, proto-incorporation
decisions outside the free speech area makes the shift more clear. In
1932, Nixon v. Condon affirmed blacks' voting rights, overruling a
Texas effort to exclude blacks from primaries.110 Over the dissent
of the Four Horsemen, Cardozo dismissed arguments that a private
political party, and not the state legislature, was the true promulgator of the racial barrier. Cardozo concluded, "The Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted as it was with special solicitude for the equal
protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the court
to level by its judgment these barriers of color."111 The same year,
Powell v. Alabama 112 and Sorrel's v. United States 113 articulated
new national standards of due process for criminal defendants in
state proceedings. Powell overturned the conviction of a black defendant because the state had denied him counsel at trial. Sorrel's
overturned a conviction because federal officers had induced the defendant to commit the crime. In 1936, Brown v. Mississippi 114 over108.
109.
I 10.
u.s. 536
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Near, 283 U.S. at 707.
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turned the conviction of a black defendant who was brutally beaten
over a period of several days until he confessed to a crime. All these
cases held states to new federal standards of fundamental fairness
before the "switch in time" of 1937.
There is a second side to the Court's shifting due process review, of course, for as the Court focused on civil and political rights
it retreated from expansive protection of contract and property
rights. If the retreat had been more swift, there would have been no
court-packing crisis, but signs of the Court's retreat appear before
1937 in the case of Nebbia v. New York,11s where Justice Roberts
upheld New York's effort to stabilize the milk industry with price
controls. Justice McReynolds in dissent was joined by the rest of
the Horsemen, and he accurately pointed out that under the Court's
precedents, freedom to set prices was a core liberty of contract.
Near itself had affirmed this principle:
[W]hile the liberty of contract is not an absolute right . . . the
power of the State stops short of interference with what are
deemed to be certain indispensable requirements of the liberty
assured, notably with respect to the fixing of prices and wages.II6

Revealingly, McReynolds cited Near in his catalogue of opinions
establishing the contours of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, supporting my view of Near as a critical transition
between Lochner and modem due process concerns.
The due process revolution ultimately styled "incorporation"
began, in the words of Palko v. Connecticut,ll1 by forcing states to
respect protections in the Bill of Rights deemed "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." The word liberty connotes an individual's freedom from government control, and it is right to insist that
the incorporation project has focused on the protection of individual liberties from government restraint. But incorporation is also
about national standards. In their insistence that open and critical
debate was essential to democratic government, the free speech
cases demanded that the states honor national standards of democratic process. The free speech, due process and commerce clause
cases all expressed a new confidence in the ability of a national democratic community to make collective decisions that bind all its
constituents.
My vision of the 1930s free speech cases fragments Bruce Ackerman's vision of the New Deal as the prime mover or inaugurator
115.
116.
117.
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of his third constitutional regime. I Is He identifies interbranch conflict followed by popular ratification as the driving process behind
fundamental changes in the Constitution. In his view, the Court's
resistance to Roosevelt's economic plan made the landslide victory
of 1936 a vindication of that plan, forcing the Court to avoid a constitutional crisis after the popular president proposed the courtpacking plan. If Stromberg and Near are as radical as I argue, if
they initiate a nationalizing shift in the balance of power between
federal government and the states, then the court-packing induced
shift of the commerce clause cases has a precursor in 1931 of equal
magnitude, and one is forced to conclude that nationalizing forces
were at work in the judiciary before the crisis of 1936. Near and
Stromberg argue that interbranch conflict is not the fulcrum of a
single decisive shift in our constitutional regime. The great changes
of 1936 began in 1931 and took a decade to flower-not just in commerce clause jurisprudence, but in First Amendment and Bill of
Rights cases as well.
Ackerman's focus on 1936 also derives support from those who
locate a decisive constitutional shift in footnote four of Caro/ene
Products, often read to establish a new theory of judicial review and
a new balance of power among the branches of the federal government.II9 Footnote four, however, cites all six extant Hughes Court
free speech opinions-Stromberg, Near, Grosjean, De Jonge,
Herndon and Lovell-and as I argued above, these cases along with
the criminal process opinions authorized new federal power over
local affairs long supervised by the states alone. Footnote four is
best read to ratify the parallel nationalism of the free speech and the
commerce clause decisions, not to pioneer a new theory of judicial
review.
In the area of First Amendment scholarship, Near and
Stromberg rebuke those who attempt to stretch the 1930s free
speech canvass around an Ackerman-inspired frame. Discussing
the Hughes Court free speech cases in the context of Ackerman's
theories of constitutional change, David Yassky claims that the decisive shift in First Amendment jurisprudence occurred "in the late
1930s."I2o In my view, this is something like calling Wickard and
Darby the decisive shift in commerce clause jurisprudence, and the
conclusion does not stand up to a close reading of the two 1931
opinions.
None of this is meant to suggest that the free speech cases ex118.
119.
120.
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actly match the jurisprudential shift of the later commerce clause
cases. Congress retains power under "dormant commerce clause"
analysis to intervene when state actions affect the national economy.
This power implies a correlative freedom to cede power to the
states. 121 The institutional relationships between state and federal
power are somewhat different in the free speech and civil rights arenas, for Congress cannot defer to state suppression of speech or
state infringement of the fundamental rights of criminal defendants.
Such differences aside, however, when the free speech cases are
compared in method and result to later commerce clause and due
process cases, they show themselves to be a critical impetus for the
major constitutional changes of the 1930s.
CONCLUSION
It is said that even without a First Amendment, the republican
structure of the Constitution would demand free speech. The First
Amendment, then, must be understood to extend beyond the terrain
of "individual rights." Individual rights are a prominent, even noble aspect of American political theory. But focus on free speech as
an individual entitlement does not capture the central importance of
rich public debate in our constitutional regime. I have argued that
the First Amendment burst into our modem jurisprudence driven
by the theory that rich public debate was central to democracy, and
by the belief that democracy at a national level was both possible
and desirable. The Hughes Court free speech cases inaugurated a
constitutional shift towards democratic nationalism that blossomed
as the Court supported an expanded commerce power and incorporation doctrine. If this perspective on the 1930s can be reduced to a
single, simple lesson, it is that free speech is best thought of as a
collective power that binds Americans together as a nation. The
emergence of this power in the 1930s marks the era of our history
when we began to envision ourselves as a national community. The
unfulfilled challenge of this power remains a vision of pluralism and
tolerance difficult to achieve in a large, heterogeneous nation. But if
we continue to believe, as did Justice Roberts, that enlightened
opinion and right conduct are possible in an open society, then
there is reason to remain optimistic about the power of free speech
to unite Americans in a more just national community over the
coming century.

121. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), a case upholding state
economic regulations that was decided the same tenn as Jones & Laughlin.

